The Community Reinvestment Act and Community Development Financial Institutions: A Return to the Bailey Building and Loan Company Model by MacInnes, Jean Lam
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 16
Issue 2 Symposium on Poverty and the Law Article 14
February 2014
The Community Reinvestment Act and
Community Development Financial Institutions: A
Return to the Bailey Building and Loan Company
Model
Jean Lam MacInnes
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jean L. MacInnes, The Community Reinvestment Act and Community Development Financial Institutions: A Return to the Bailey Building
and Loan Company Model, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 587 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol16/iss2/14
NOTES
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: A RETURN TO THE BAILEY
BUILDING AND LOAN COMPANY MODEL
JEAN LAM MACINNES*
INTRODUCTION
The closing scene of It's a Wonderful Life' may well be one of
the most memorable in Hollywood history. Certainly every
Christmas season and especially since the September 11 th attacks
in New York City and Washington, D.C., we are reminded of our
communities' charitable nature. But what we fail to recognize is
that the Pottersville2 aberration of a dilapidated shantytown is a
reality across the United States, rural and urban. In spite of the
magnitude of wealth generated in the economically prosperous
times of the late 1990s, many low- and middle-income neighbor-
hoods were omitted from sharing in the nation's growth. Former
President Clinton emphasized this disproportionate effect in
1999 during a tour of the nation's most impoverished areas when
he said, "I want everybody in America to know that while our
* B.S., 1996, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions;J.D. Candidate, 2002, Notre Dame Law School; ThomasJ. White Scholar,
2000-2002. I dedicate this Note to my husband, John Michael Maclnnes, for
his constant love and support. Many thanks and much gratitude to Vincent D.
Rougeau, Conrad Kellenberg, Matthew J. Barrett, Lucy S. Payne, Emily Nyen
Chang, Yvette Ho, Yvonne Ho, Daniel P. McCabe, Peter Hui, Brian Lam, my
parents-Kowk Chee and Kam Fung Lam-and the rest of my family, for
reminding me of the value of social responsibility and inspiring me through
their examples.
1. IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
2. In the movie, It's a Wonderful Life, George Bailey, who runs a local sav-
ings and loan institution, is shown how his world would have been if he had
never existed. One illustration depicts how his town falls under the onerous
dominion of Mr. Potter, the big town banker, because he controls all the money
in the community. Without Bailey's credit resources, his neighbors are unable
to afford nice homes or maintain the ones they have and are forced to live in a
Hooverville-type district.
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country has been blessed with this economic recovery, not all
Americans have been blessed by it."' Although low- and middle-
income populations' access to prosperity and corresponding
credit has been hindered for decades, it was only first noticed in
the 1950s and not addressed until the 197 0s with the enactment
of The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 ("CRA").4
During the last twenty-five years, the CRA has attempted to
equalize the opportunities for credit in communities of all
income. However, no legislation charged with the noble task of
correcting pervasive economic injustice is without its flaws. The
CRA has endured strong criticism from the banking industry,
community activists, and economists. But as a result, the CRA
has undergone some reformation to better reflect the practical
realities of the credit market and the banking industry. These
new rules have incorporated the community activists' desire to
strengthen the CRA and have decreased the CRA's administra-
tive burden satisfying the banking industry.
As a more efficient tool, the new CRA achieves the CRA's
original goal of eliminating credit discrimination. One emphasis
of the revised legislation is the creative use of Community Devel-
opment Financial Institutions ("CDFIs") as a vehicle for CRA
compliance. CDFIs are better suited than traditional banks to
meet the needs of low- and middle-income communities because
they are formed with social responsibility along with economic
profit as their mission. To fulfill their mission, CDFIs not only
provide essential credit to their communities but also educa-
tional support to use that credit wisely and efficiently.
This Note advocates investment in CDFIs as the best form of
CRA compliance for financial institutions. Additionally, this
Note proposes additional revisions to retain the effectiveness of
the CRA while reflecting the changing credit market and finan-
cial modernization movement.
Beginning with an examination of the lack of credit in low-
and middle-income communities and the community banks'
lending practices presumed to provide this much needed credit
prior to the enactment of the CRA, Part I discusses the legislation
presented in the 1970s and strengthened in 1993 to alleviate the
problems of disproportionate credit. A study of the historical
and economic origins of the CRA follows, scrutinizing the limita-
3. Charles Babington, Desperation Despite a VIP Visit; After a Presidential Trip
and Promises of Investment, Tough Work Remains for Hard-Pressed Communities,
WASH. POST, July 7, 1999, at A2.
4. See Nellie R. Santiago et al., Turning David and Goliath into the Odd
Couple: How the New Community Reinvestment Act Promotes Community Development
Financial Institutions, 6J.L. & POL'Y 571, 578 (1998).
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tions and effectiveness of the 1977 act. Much criticism has arisen
since the enactment of the CRA from parties on all sides of the
credit argument-bankers, community development activists,
and economists. To respond to these deficiencies, the regulatory
agencies entrusted with the public responsibility to level the
credit playing field reformed the CRA in 1993. Part II continues
with a review of CDFIs, their definition, the Community Develop-
ment Banking and Financial Institutions Act ("CDBFIA"), and
the various entity structures available. The effectiveness of CDFIs
in CRA compliance is evaluated in Part III.
The financial industry has gone through an immense trans-
formation in the last decade resulting, in part, from a booming
economy, deregulation, and the advent of the Internet. One
congressional attempt to keep pace with these rapid changes was
the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Moderniza-
tion Act of 1999 ("GLBA"). 5 However, this legislation fails to
incorporate changes to the CRA required to conform with modi-
fications in the credit market. The need for an update to the
CRA is discussed in Part IV. Part V concludes with a summary of
the need for community reinvestment in low- and middle-income
communities, the means of achieving community reinvestment,
and a call for continued reformation of the CRA.
I. THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT OF 1977
A. History and Background
Many banks and local governments were blamed for aban-
doning poor neighborhoods and their seemingly unimportant
residents.6 Reports of banks practicing "redlining" and "commu-
nity disinvestment" led to public demand for investigation and
reform. Denying these accusations, bankers claimed their lend-
ing practices were based on prudent business judgment and the
bottom line. Any government interference would artificially dis-
5. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). Gramm, a longtime oppo-
nent of the CRA, sought to consolidate many of the financial services compa-
nies to remain competitive with foreign financial services conglomerates and to
update the banking regulations by removing artificial restrictions on the finan-
cial services industry.
6. Whether proper blame belongs with the banks and local governments
is a "chicken or egg" argument. Did the banks and local governments' prefer-
ence of the high-income class at the expense of low-income families cause the
decay of lower income communities? Or did the decay of lower income com-
munities drive the banks and local governments to disinvest? This Note does
not address the cause of the decay-many theories in this area have been well
documented-but rather focuses on the effects of the decay and the productive
process involved in correcting such injustice.
2002]
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tort the free financial market. Bankers feared regulation in this
area would cause a collapse of the banking industry and "if taken
to an extreme, creat[e] a socialist-style redistribution of wealth."'
However, the effects of unregulated banking practices have been
too detrimental to ignore, and requiring banks to assist in the
redevelopment of their communities has become a legislative
priority..
"Redlining" is the practice by bank officers of "actually or
figuratively draw[ing] a red line on a map around areas of their
city"' and instructing their bank lending personnel to reject loan
applications from residents and businesses in those areas. Banks
historically perceived the residents in these areas as "high credit
risks"9 and prospective businesses as "unlikely to retain their
value and are therefore inadequate collateral for loans."'" How-
ever, many studies have shown that these blacklisted communi-
ties were "disproportionately located in minority and low- to
moderate-income neighborhoods in central cities."" Racial and
income discrimination have long been cited as the unconscious
or possibly conscious reason for the practice of redlining.12
"Community disinvestment" refers to the large-scale diver-
sion of local community deposits to larger, more favorable
money markets where the interest rates are higher. Thus, money
invested by local community residents is shipped off to other
lending markets, leaving the local urban and farming communi-
ties without sufficient credit resources even though the local com-
munity generated that money. In a two-year study conducted by
7. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 580 (citing Griffith L. Garwood &
Dolores Smith, The Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79
FED. RES. BULL. 251, 251 (1993)).
8. 123 CONG. REc. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Senator William Proxmire
of Wisconsin, sponsor of the CRA, reporting on the Banking Committee's study
on the problem of redlining and disinvestment) [hereinafter Proxmire
Statement].
9. Wendy Cassity, Note, The Case for a Credit Union Community Reinvestment
Act, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 348 (2000).
10. Id.
11. Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: Eco-
nomic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO.
L.J. 237, 241 (1996) (citing GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., AN EMPIRiCAL STUDY OF
MORTGAGE REDLINING 1-33 (1978) (summarizing a number of empirical studies
confirming the existence of redlining in various communities)).
12. See Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Histori-
cal and Legal Interpretation of Redlining under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL
L. REv. 617 passim (1999); Richard D. Marsico, Shedding Some Light on Lending:
The Effect of Expanded Disclosure Laws on Home Mortgage Marketing Lending and
Discrimination in the New York Metropolitan Area, 27 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 481, 528
(1999).
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the Senate Banking Committee prior to the passage of the CRA,
data showed only about eleven percent of the money deposited
in Brooklyn remained in the community and only ten percent of
the money invested by residents of the District of Columbia was
reinvested back into the district."3 Los Angeles, St. Louis, Indian-
apolis, and Cleveland documented similar results.14
B. The Enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
In 1977, Congress responded to these detrimental practices
by enacting the CRA. The CRA's purpose is to encourage banks
to meet the credit needs of their surrounding local communities
while remaining economically viable.15 Directed by four regula-
tory agencies-the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the Office of Thrift Super-
vision-the CRA allows regulators to evaluate CRA performance
in routine regulatory examinations and through approvals trig-
gered by banks' requests for charters, mergers, acquisitions,
branch openings, office relocations, or deposit insurance cover-
age. 16 Upon the completion of the evaluation, banks receive one
of four possible CRA ratings: outstanding; satisfactory; needs to
improve; or substantial noncompliance. 7
The sponsors of the CRA believed banks needed "to take
active roles in community revitalization not only because their
lending practices help[ed] contribute to [the] urban decline,
but also because banks are ideally situated to reverse that decline:
They have 'the capital, the know-how, and the efficiency to do
the job."18
Additionally, banks, as corporate citizens, have a societal
duty to sow the seeds of prosperity in their surrounding commu-
nities where the banks have reaped their rewards. Banks are
social actors and are as responsible for their communities as are
the local schools, churches, and other businesses. Indeed, Pope
13. See Proxmire Statement, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2001) ("to help meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institutions").
16. See Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obsta-
cles to Development Lending, 17 YAE J. ON REG. 197, 202-03 (2000).
17. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (2) (A)-(D) (2001).
18. See Cassity, supra note 9, at 349 (citing Proxmire Statement, supra note
2002]
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John Paul II dictates this accountability in Centesimus Annus,"9
"society is not directed against the market, but demands that the
market be appropriately controlled by the forces of society and
by the State, so as to guarantee that the basic needs of the whole
of society are satisfied."20
The enactment of the CRA was a step in the right direction
in furthering the public policy of community reinvestment and
social responsibility. However, as worthy as these causes were,
bankers contended that the onerous and ministerial require-
ments of the CRA misdirected scarce bank resources from valua-
ble loan monies to the bureaucracy of CRA compliance instead.
In contrast, other critics in community development complained
that the CRA had bark but not bite. Frankly, it would be naive to
believe a statute, which enacted such a major policy shift, would
not be without its critics and growing pains.
C. The Criticism and Limitations of the CRA
Since its inception, the CRA has generated criticism from all
sides-from the bankers it seeks to regulate to the communities
it is supposed to help. The banking industry decries the onerous
administrative burdens imposed by the CRA, while community
groups fault regulatory agencies for lax and ineffective enforce-
ment. At the same time, economists focus on the socialist philos-
ophy of mandatory reinvestment calling it a "governmentally-
imposed credit allocation '21 coercing "a private sector indus-
try... into providing a service which contradicts the dictates of
the marketplace. Forced allocation of capital . . . is at best dam-
aging to a financial institution and at worst a publicly mandated
redistribution of wealth. '22
1. From the Banking Industry
Not surprisingly, the banking industry, largely motivated by
profit, agrees with the economists but also complains of several
other issues: (i) the substantial paperwork required by the CRA;
(ii) the vagueness of the CRA's language; (iii) the over-extension
of authority by regulators; (iv) the abuse of public disclosure of
19. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS (1993), available at http://
www.vatican.va/holyather/john-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-
ii-enc_01051991_centesimus-annusen.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) [here-
inafter CENTESIMuS ANNUS].
20. Id. at para. 35.
21. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 309 (1993).
22. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 583 (citing Macey & Miller, supra note
21, at 308-10, 312, 319-24).
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CRA ratings by community activists, which increases transaction
costs; and (v) the unfair competition resulting from the exclu-
sion of similar CRA regulations for insurance and securities com-
panies beginning to engage in banking practices.2 3
The CRA requires banks to keep detailed demographic
information of their loan applications, keeping track not only of
granted loans but of loan applications that have been rejected as
well. The banking industry has ranked CRA administration as
the number one compliance burden of all bank regulations.2 4
Additionally, the CRA was vaguely drafted in order to remain
elastic and applicable to future changes in the economy and the
banking industry. 25 The CRA's lack of specificity, however, pro-
vides little guidance to bank officers who want to comply with its
requirements.
Additionally, vague regulations can lead to inconsistent
enforcement and abuse from the grant of too much discretionary
power to regulators. Bankers resent evaluators who appear to
overstep their regulatory authority. "The occasional use of harsh
sanctions, such as cease-and-desist orders, has left many bankers
feeling that regulators have grossly exceeded their statutory
authority."26 The vagueness of the CRA requirements also allows
regulators much discretion in their evaluations, making it diffi-
cult for bankers to predict what CRA rating they may be granted.
Bankers (and their lawyers) are generally averse to such uncer-
tainties, especially in large transactions such as mergers or acqui-
sitions, and will do whatever they can to reduce it.
Another complaint bankers have is with the CRA's required
public disclosure of bank compliance ratings and lending data.
Bankers claim community activist groups abuse such information
through damaging public opinion campaigns and increased
political pressure on politicians and regulators, holding bank
officers hostage and demanding approval of possibly unprofita-
ble loans or investment in less than favorable markets. 27 Certain
events can precipitate CRA evaluation, such as when a bank
23. See id. at 586-87.
24. See Patrick A. Broderick & David E. Teitelbaum, Recent Developments
Under the Community Reinvestment Act: 1991-1992, 48 Bus. LAw. 1063 (1993); Bar-
bara Rehm, Cost of Compliance Equals 59% of Bank Profits, AM. BANKER, June 18,
1992, at 1, 12; Matt Schulz, Small-Bank Survey Ranks CRA, Truth-in-Savings Rules
as Top Compliance Problems, AM. BANKER, Apr. 18, 1996, at 8; Macey & Miller,
supra note 21, at 324-25.
25. See Hylton, supra note 16, at 201 (stating "this uncertainty is a major
reason for its continued vitality").
26. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 586.
27. See id. at 586-87 (citing Broderick & Teitelbaum, supra note 24, at
1070-71; Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 333-37).
2002]
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wants to charter in a new state, merge with another bank, or
open a new branch.
Community groups will often take advantage of the evalua-
tion period to highlight a bank's lack of commitment to commu-
nity development. A bank is highly vulnerable to this political
pressure because the costly process of consummating a transac-
tion has begun. A great deal of capital has been invested and the
bank has relied upon the expected returns of the transaction.
Due to the imbalanced leverage, banks may enter into last min-
ute side agreements with community groups that are not in the
best interest of the bank. These heavy-handed tactics may sub-
stantially increase transaction costs and, at the very least, are dis-
tracting to the deal at hand."8 Agreeing with the banking
industry, Senator Gramm has likened community groups to
extortionists.29
Finally, with the current financial modernization movement,
commercial banks, securities firms, and insurance companies are
now allowed to merge their businesses and enter each other's
market prompted by the repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act,
30
the amendment of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act,3 1 and
the enactment of the GLBA. As a result of this movement, many
insurance and securities firms have entered the banking market
without having to comply with the onerous CRA requirements.
Bankers argue that the CRA should be extended to include these
new financial holding companies engaging in banking practices
because a failure to do so creates unfair competition. 2
28. See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 322-37.
29. See Mark Pinskey & Christina Weinmann, Development Groups Could
Play Key Role in Wider CRA, AM. BANKER, July 28, 2000, at 13.
30. The Glass-Steagall Act is composed of §§ 16, 20, 21, 32 of the Banking
Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78 & 377-78 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (repealed
1999). Enacted right after the Great Depression, which many believed was par-
tially caused by some banks' investment in risky speculation of the stock market,
the Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial banking from investment banking
and did not allow commercial banks to conduct securities transactions and
investment banks from granting loans. See Adam Nguyen & Matt Watkins,
Recent Legislation: Financial Services Reform, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 579, 579-81
(2000).
31. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (amended 1999). The
Bank Holding Company Act "restricted bank holding companies from acquir-
ing or retaining ownership or control of the voting shares of non-banking enti-
ties, in particular, insurance companies." Nguyen & Watkins, supra note 30, at
580.
32. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 587-88.
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2. From the Community Groups
Community groups actually agree with bankers that the
CRA's reach should be extended to include other companies
that have access to capital and could therefore strengthen the
financial infrastructure of their communities. However, commu-
nity groups also assert that necessary changes to CRA enforce-
ment are required for the CRA to be effective in the banking
industry and in the financial services industry as a whole. Recom-
mended CRA reforms include the following: (i) elimination of
CRA grade inflation; (ii) proportional investments in low- to mid-
dle-income communities; (iii) public hearings on all major bank
applications; (iv) public input on bank community development
activities; (v) increased disclosure of banking practices; and (vi)
denial of "safe harbors" and small bank exemptions.38
Statistics show that more than ninety-eight percent of banks
currently receive a passing CRA rating of "outstanding" or "satis-
factory."34 Community groups and banks give various contradic-
tory reasons for the overwhelming statistic. Because less than two
percent of its industry is rated at "needs to improve" or "substan-
tial noncompliance," banks argue they have succeeded in
responding to Congress's initiatives on community reinvest-
ment." Banks could contend they are being vilified for actually
doing a good job of meeting local credit needs and complying
with banking regulations.3 6
Community groups, on the other hand, argue that the statis-
tics alone provide clear evidence of CRA grade inflation. Prior to
the enactment of the CRA, studies showed an absence of banks'
community involvement. Had the banking industry been so sup-
portive of community reinvestment, as the CRA ratings demon-
strate, the CRA would have been unnecessary. As such, there
must be another reason for such high CRA ratings other than the
fact that banks have improved their practices to such "outstand-
ing" levels. Senator Proxmire postulates his theory at the 1988
Congressional hearings on the status of the CRA:
Redlining hasn't disappeared. Neighborhoods are still
starving for credit. Too many bankers still think the grass
is greener elsewhere . . . [yet] U.S. lenders are all above
33. See id. at 588.
34. See Kenneth H. Thomas, CRA Grade Inflation, at 1 (The Jerome Levy
Econ. Inst. of Bard. C. Working Paper No. 313, 2000), available at http://
www.levy.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
35. See id.
36. The banks could claim this is similar to a "damned if I do and
damned if I don't" argument.
2002]
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average. Almost all get high ratings year after year and
almost none is ever held back.... And I ask myself, how is
it that so many neighborhoods are continuing to fail while
so many lending institutions are continuing to pass?
3 7
One reason for the banking industry's success, community
groups suspect, is that banks have "mastered the CRA examina-
tion and evaluation process to guarantee passing ratings, regard-
less of actual CRA performance."3 8 Another reason focuses on
the bank regulator's lenient granting of high marks. Dr. Ken-
neth H. Thomas, a lecturer in finance at The Wharton School in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, presented a working paper for The
Jerome Levy Economics Institute on CRA Grade Inflation,3 9 where
he identifies and examines a "Friendly Regulator Hypothesis."4 °
Thomas's hypothesis is based on suspicions that "bank regulators
are more interested in appeasing and becoming friendly with
banks by inflating ratings than objectively evaluating and rating
them."4 1
Many motivations exist for bank regulators to embrace this
practice. Poor CRA ratings often result in confrontational and
stressful interviews for CRA evaluators, generally with bank man-
agement or their superiors. The "unwanted scrutiny from superi-
ors at the regional (and sometimes even Washington, D.C.)
office [may be caused by] complaints and even formal appeals
from upset bankers."4 2 Being more lax in their evaluations make
the CRA regulators' job much easier. In addition, some critics
claim friendly CRA evaluators want to use their government posi-
tion as a stepping-stone to more lucrative positions in the private
banking industry as CRA compliance officers or consultants.
37. U.S. Congress, Status of the Community Reinvestment Act (Washington,
D.C.) vol. 1, at 18 (1992) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (cited in Thomas, supra
note 34, at 4).
38. Thomas, supra note 34, at 1 n.3.
39. Thomas presented this paper at the Tenth Annual Hyman P. Minsky
Conference on Financial Structure, The Liberalization of Financial Markets:
National and International Perspectives, on April 28, 2000 for The Jerome Levy
Economics Institute of Bard College, Annandale-on-the-Hudson, New York.
40. Thomas, supra note 34, at 1-2, 29, 37-38. Thomas uses a CRA grade
inflation methodology and regression analysis under both the original CRA and
the later amendments to the CRA to first determine if grade inflation exists
(which he finds it does) and then to determine if the "Friendly Regulator
Hypothesis" is supported by the research (which he finds it is).
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id.
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Community groups argue that consistent grade inflating
CRA regulators must be held more accountable.4" The undesir-
able scrutiny from Washington, D.C. should not come when the
CRA rating is low, but when the CRA rating is high. The pre-
sumption needs to be shifted to reflect the studies conducted
before the enactment of the CRA, which showed banks were gen-
erally not active in community reinvestment.
Another recommendation community groups feel is neces-
sary to fully effect the goals of the CRA is "the use of a detailed
market share analysis mechanism that would require banks to
make investments in [low- to moderate-income] communities
proportional to the bank's total assets."4 4 The 1993 CRA propo-
sal originally included this recommendation but was withdrawn
when bankers accused legislators of imposing a form of forced
credit allocation.45 Additionally, holding public hearings on all
major bank applications, seeking and considering public input
on bank community development activities, increased disclosure
of banking practices, and denial of "safe harbors" and small bank
exemptions would further strengthen the CRA's effectiveness.
3. From the Economists
Economists, however, question the true effectiveness of the
CRA. Macey and Miller outlined several flaws of the CRA, while
"applaud[ing] the basic goals of this legislation."46 Beginning
with similar arguments advanced by the banking industry, Macey
and Miller agree: the CRA's language is vague and self-contradic-
tory, resulting in arbitrary enforcement; CRA compliance
increases transaction costs; and unfair competition is created as a
negative externality of financial reform laws failing to apply CRA
obligations to similar lending institutions. In addition to these
arguments, the two law and economic theorists claim that some
of the CRA's premises are outdated and without justification,
that the CRA's purpose has been distorted to include social bene-
fits, and that the CRA forces banks to make unsound lending
decisions.47
43. See id. at 24-26. Thomas outlines his findings of Most Significant CRA
Grade Inflators (the Minneapolis Federal Reserve System is listed as number
one) and Most Realistic CRA Graders (the New York FDIC is listed first), in
Table 1-Overall Grade Inflation Under the New CRA by Regulator and
District.
44. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 588.
45. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,157 (May 4, 1995) (cited in Santiago et al., supra
note 4, at 588 n.47).
46. Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 294.
47. See id.
20021
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Macey and Miller challenge the CRA's archaic ideology that
banks should be local entities, that banks drain credit from their
local communities, and that banks owe some responsibility to
their local communities. Much of this localism proposition is
derived from the historical folklore of the local banker, a pillar of
the community, as portrayed in It's a Wonderful Life.48 However,
the economists assert that banks were local earlier in the twenti-
eth century by necessity due to the transportation, technological,
and legal limitations of banking outside their communities, not
because localism is inherent in a bank's nature.49 Furthermore,
"[t] he erosion of localism was not a matter of bankers' collective
moral lapse in failing to serve their home towns; it was a product
of [economic] forces over which bankers had little control and
that, on balance, have served the overall economic welfare of the
American people."5
Deregulation, economies of scale, and diversification of
bank portfolios motivated banks to merge and expand into inter-
state markets. Additionally with the advent of Internet banking,
direct deposit, wire transfer services, and automatic teller
machines, consumers rarely require the local presence of their
bank. In fact, consumers may prefer more national banks due to
increased traveling and the globalization of capital markets. As
our economy becomes more worldwide and technology
advances, banks must grow to remain competitive. This growth
not only leads to the severance of local ties to their community,
but also more efficient banking, improved services, and
enhanced asset diversification, which challenges whether banks
really should be local entities.
The premises that banks drain credit and owe some respon-
sibility to their communities are also analyzed from a purely eco-
nomic perspective. Banks are traders of credit,just like any other
commodity, and sell this commodity to the buyer who values it
the most, regardless of the buyer's location.5 Ignoring this pric-
ing system might be a breach of the bank's fiduciary duties to its
shareholders and weaken its viability.
Banks may have had a previous obligation to their localities
originating from valuable market privileges extended by the
community, such as an effective monopoly when only few banks
were chartered. However, in recent times, the growing number
of financial institutions permitted to conduct banking activities
48. IT'S A WONDERFUL LiFE, supra note 1.
49. See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 304-07.
50. Id. at 305.
51. See id. at 307-10.
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has increased competition and virtually eliminated any privileges
previously granted.5 2 Thus, banks should no longer be indebted
to their communities.
Banks' obligations to their community also should not
include social responsibilities. Macey and Miller argue that the
CRA's original purpose did not include social benefits, such as
affirmative action-type lending and charitable giving. The CRA
was not intended to induce banking practices based solely on
politically correct criteria, but instead its purpose was to
encourage reinvestment in local communities:" However, as dis-
cussed earlier, Senator Proxmire's concerns of redlining and
community disinvestment resulted in the enactment of the
CRA.54 Such social benefits could be interpreted as the intended
by-product of the CRA, if not its implied purpose as well.
Macey and Miller finally contend that if good profitable
opportunities exist within their communities, banks, in their pri-
mary motivation for profit, would certainly invest locally. Thus,
government intervention in the form of the CRA is unnecessary
and may even be detrimental in compelling banks to make
unsound lending decisions. CRA compliance also discourages
diversification of a bank's portfolio, which increases risk by cen-
tralizing their loans in one community. Inducing banks to insti-
tute banking practices based on CRA compliance and not
economic factors results in unsound and unsafe business
consequences.55
However, by applying strict economic theory, Macey and
Miller minimize the need for social responsibility and omit the
human factor in bank management. A bank must fulfill its role
as a responsible corporate citizen. Playing a very important role
in the local community, banks provide credit, savings, and check-
ing services and loans for neighborhood development and revi-
talization. In this capacity, banks are in the unique role of being
able to equalize the credit gap due to human failings in the sub-
jective evaluation of loans.
"[M] any people . . .do not have the means which would
enable them to take their place in an effective and
humanly dignified way .... They have no way of entering
the network of knowledge and intercommunication which
would enable them to see their qualities appreciated and
52. See id. at 310-12.
53. See id. at 337-41.
54. See Proxmire Statement, supra note 8; see discussion supra Parts L.A,
I.B.
55. See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 318-22.
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utilized. Thus .... they are to a great extent marginalized;
economic development takes place over their heads ....
[T]here are many human needs which find no place on
the market."
5 6
Pope John Paul II advises corporate citizens to act socially
responsible, knowing that "even the decision to invest in one
place rather than another . . . is always a moral and cultural
choice."' 57 Furthermore, governments must intervene in the pub-
lic interest for "there are collective and qualitative needs which
cannot be satisfied by market mechanisms. There are important
human needs which escape [the market's] logic.
'5 8
Additionally, profitable loans within a bank's community
have been overlooked partly because the lending decision was
made by a fallible human being, not a pure economic actor with
full information and only motivated by profit. As previously dis-
cussed, discrimination and the erroneous belief that marginal-
ized communities were not bankable markets lead to a wholesale
abandonment of neighborhoods.59 But this is simply not true.
As exemplified by the success of the responsible subprime lend-
ing market, investment in lower credit-rated communities can be
very profitable. Also, the required community where a bank
must invest is its community. In the best position to evaluate
lending decisions, the local bank can incorporate the intangible
factors not listed on a loan application, for example, the local
behaviors and preferences of consumers and the local reputation
of an applicant.
The Federal Reserve Board has also recently released a study
on the profitability of CRA lending, which reported that the
majority of lending was profitable,6 ° "pleas [ing] the double bot-
tom line-social impact and financial rewards."6 1 But this volun-
tary study is limited in scope because only 143 out of 500 banking
institutions responded to the survey. Also, the level of profitabil-
ity varied with the type of lending and the size of the banking
institution, resulting in some unprofitable CRA lending and
some less profitable loans when compared to market lending.6 2
56. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 19, at paras. 33-34.
57. Id. at para. 36 (emphasis in original).
58. Id. at para. 40.
59. See discussion supra Part I.A.
60. See Fed. Res. Board, Survey of the Performance and Profitability of CRA-
Related Lending, http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Surveys/CRAloan-
survey (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Profitability Survey].
61. Pinskey & Weinmann, supra note 29.
62. See id.; Profitability Survey, supra note 60; Phil Gramm, CRA Needs
Reform, All Right, to Stop Bad Lending, Am. BANKER, Aug. 4, 2000, at 13.
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4. Evidence of CRA Effectiveness
Unfortunately, no comprehensive evidence establishing the
effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the CRA has emerged. Statis-
tics do show an economic improvement in inner city lending
markets.63 However, with so many factors having a substantial
impact on the economic development in communities, it is hard
to attribute the success of any community redevelopment to any
one factor. Since 1980 and before the recent economic down-
turn, interest rates and unemployment have declined.6 4 The
economy, as a whole, was in an upswing during the last decade
with the Dow Jones Industrial Average and NASDAQ reaching
the highest point levels in history.6 5
With the strong economy and bull market of the late 1990s,
society's attitude about investment changed. Though not with-
out its dips and peaks, the prevailing belief remains that the mar-
ket is still a smart investment, especially to achieve diversification.
Wealthy and middle income individuals shifted their savings out
of traditional bank accounts, which may have only achieved a two
to four percent interest rate, and into the stock market either
through direct investments or mutual funds, which yielded
returns up to fifty percent.6 6 Also because of the financial mod-
ernization movement, mortgage companies began competing
with banks, drawing some of the favorable lending business away.
To respond to this movement of investment funds and lending
prospects, banks need to reach out to new, underserved markets
which include deposits from less wealthy customers. "Lower
income borrowers have emerged in recent years as the fastest
growing segment of the home mortgage market.
67
Lastly, metropolitan mayors have made business develop-
ment a priority in their administration, providing more incen-
tives to encourage businesses to stay or, alternatively, relocate to
the city. New businesses and, with the help of local city govern-
63. See Hylton, supra note 16, at 204.
64. See id. at 204-05.
65. Certain current events have dramatically changed the national econ-
omy, namely the end of the dot corn era, the September 11 th attacks, the ensu-
ing War on Terrorism, a return to budget deficits, and the Enron/Arthur
Andersen financial scandal. However, because these events are so recent and
some have never been encountered, no concrete data exist to factor these
changes into our analysis and their effect on CRA lending.
66. See Hylton, supra note 16, at 205 (citingJJAMEs L. PIERCE, THE FUTURE
OF BANKING 5-9 (1991) (explaining this process, known as "disinter-
mediation")).
67. Id. (citing John R. Wilke, Giving Credit: Mortgage Lending to Minorities
Shows a Sharp 1994 Increase, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1996, at Al).
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ments, more successful businesses strengthen the financial infra-
structure, thereby making inner cities a more attractive lending
market. 68
The number of valid and manifold factors makes it difficult
to truly assess the effectiveness of the CRA in achieving its social
responsibility and credit equalizing goals. Certainly, it would be
inaccurate to deny that the CRA has had a positive impact. At
the very least, Congress sent the banking industry a distinct mes-
sage requiring some amount of corporate duty to its
communities.
D. The New CRA
To address the criticisms and limitations of the originally
enacted CRA, in 1993 former President Clinton asked the four
regulatory agencies to develop CRA reforms, focusing on lessen-
ing the administrative compliance burdens, developing more
objective evaluation methods and reducing the adversarial con-
flict between the banking industry and community activist
groups.6 9 After two proposals7" and almost 14,000 public com-
ment letters,7 the Federal Reserve Board of Governors issued
the final rules on May 4, 1995, with an effective date of July 1,
1995.72
To lessen the substantial paperwork for the banking indus-
try, the new rules require less documentation and concentrate
on "performance context"73 evaluations, resulting in less inter-
ruption of a bank's daily routine 4. 7  The new rules also provide
more guidance with recommendations of the type of activities
that would achieve a passing CRA grade. This gives the CRA rat-
ing process more certainty and allows banks to properly tailor
their practices for compliance.
Additionally, the new rules offer banks a choice of being
evaluated under alternative performance standards. These new
68. See id. at 205 (citing America's Cities: They Can Yet Be Resurrected, ECONO-
MIST, Jan. 10, 1998, at 19).
69. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 590 (citing 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156-57
(May 4, 1995)).
70. See 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (Oct. 7, 1994) (the first proposal); 60 Fed.
Reg. 22,156, 22,158 (May 4, 1995) (the second proposal).
71. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 590-91.
72. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (May 4, 1995).
73. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 591 (explaining "[t]his 'performance
context' provides a crucial qualitative element that allows examiners to adjust
bank compliance scores to account for special circumstances related to the con-
text of their local business environment.") (citing 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(b)
(1998)).
74. See id. at 593.
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standards "recognize that CRA should not be a one-size- fits-all
regulation."75 Banks have the option of developing their own
strategic plan to meet CRA compliance or using a tripartite test,
which evaluates lending, investing, and financial services. Both
options offer a more tailored yet objective approach to the CRA
grading process. More guidelines would reduce the amount of
discretion of a CRA evaluator, and therefore, may possibly
counter the previously stated problem of CRA grade inflation.
This new flexibility also allows smaller banks to opt into a
performance standard appropriate to the nuances of their sub-
category. Most of their traditional lending activities can now sat-
isfy the CRA requirements. In return for this easier satisfaction,
smaller banks will have to fulfill the more burdensome
paperwork and process requirements of the original CRA.
Larger retail banks, which due to their size make data collection
more difficult, can take advantage of the lesser documentation
requirements of the new CRA. At the same time, they will also
have to be more creative in their compliance with the CRA
requirements.
One creative measure the new CRA emphasizes repeatedly is
indirect, third party intermediary lending and investing, for
example, contributing to CDFIs.
In addition to providing for direct loans straight to individ-
uals and businesses, the regulations now contain require-
ments and incentives for banks to lend money to, invest
resources in, and provide financial services to and through
a form of local organization called a community develop-
ment financial institution ("CDFI"). These organizations,
in turn, re-lend or invest the money in the community,
enabling the bank to receive CRA "credit" for the
funding. 76
This recommendation from the regulatory agencies strikes a bet-
ter balance between the banking industry and community activist
groups, creating a valuable symbiotic relationship. CDFIs are an
innovative way of reaching the safe, sound, and profitable lend-
ing goals of banks and the economic development goals of com-
munity reinvestment groups. The relationship between the two
goals no longer needs to be adversarial or exclusive of each
other.
75. JAMES C. SIVON, AM. BANKERS Ass'N, THE NEW CRA: EXECUTIVE SUM-
MARY 2 (1995).
76. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 591-92. CDFIs are discussed in more
detail in Part II.
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II. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Although CDFIs were not statutorily recognized until 1994,
some have claimed the grassroots movement and philosophy of
CDFIs have existed since the days of "immigrant guilds of New
York City's Lower East Side [and] the Prairie Populists of the late
1800s."77 Others feel CDFIs more closely parallel the early credit
union movement in 1990 because credit unions were formed
during the recession to consolidate scarce financial resources of
certain populations, generally along occupational lines, and pro-
vide financial support to each other.7" Still others equate CDFIs
with other community-based organizations ("CBOs") that were
"based on the idea of local residents learning to help themselves
after the failure of various government programs"7 9 in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century.
The scope of CBOs, however, is much broader than that of
CDFIs. CBOs provide services that range from lending advice,
home building or maintenance tips, assistance in applying for
and understanding welfare and other social services programs, to
child care help. CDFIs could be considered a sub-organization
of CBOs, and in fact, some large CBOs have formed CDFIs as a
part of their community assistance. One example is the Union
Settlement Federal Credit Union, a community development
credit union (one type of CDFI), which is run by the Union Set-
tlement Association of East Harlem (a CBO).8 0
However they originated, CDFIs are now a very successful
and promising form of community reinvestment, meeting the
credit needs of the unbankable. Approximately 500 CDFIs are in
operation across the United States, with the highest concentra-
tion located in New York State (80).81 These CDFIs are in the
form of Community Development Banks ("CDBs"), Community
Development Credit Unions ("CDCUs"), Community Develop-
ment Loan Funds ("CDLFs"), and Community Development
Venture Capital Funds ("CDVCFs"). Community organizations
are continually becoming more creative in forming CDFIs and
have also developed Micro-Enterprise Loan Funds ("MELFs")
77. Id. at 598 (brackets in original) (quoting Coalition of Community
Dev. Fin. Inst., Who We Are, at http://www.cdfi.org/whoweare.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2002)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 598-99.
80. See id. at 599.
81. See CDFI Coalition, Directory of Community Development Financial
Institutions (1999) (cited in Nat'l Community Cap. Ass'n, Community Develop-
ment Industry Statistics, at http://www.communitycapital.org/community-
development/finance/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002)).
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and community development corporation-based lenders. With
the banking industry, government, and public's support of these
CDFIs, in whichever form, community organizations can con-
tinue to develop other beneficial, financial entities to provide
credit that will stimulate the growth of new local businesses, job
development, and revitalized housing.
A. Defining CDFIs
The common thread defining a CDFI is its philosophy to
serve as a "financial intermediary that has community develop-
ment as its primary mission and develops a range of programs
and methods to meet the needs of low-income communities."
8 2
A CDFI commonly provides more than just loan funds to its cus-
tomers. Its investment is not just in the loan but also in the bor-
rowers themselves and in the community where both the CDFI
and borrowers operate. In addition to a wide range of financial
services, a CDFI also provides extensive technical support ser-
vices, which include training and education in credit, financial
accounting, business planning, and even basic bookkeeping.
Unlike a bank, a CDFI does not simply lend money and wait for
payments to come in. Lending officers of a CDFI will often fol-
low up with their borrowers, checking in, making house calls,
and offering further advice or assistance to their borrowers.8 " A
CDFI has a greater incentive, other than pure profit, to insure
that the financial health of its customer base is strong; a CDFI
has a vested interest in strengthening the financial infrastructure
of its surrounding community.
B. The Community Development Banking and Financial
Institutions Act
In 1994, Congress began to recognize the benefits of CDFIs
and decided to encourage their operations by enacting the
CDBFIA, which endowed a Community Development Financial
Institutions Fund ("CDFI Fund") to be administered by the
Department of the Treasury. 4 Community lending organiza-
82. Coalition of Community Dev. Fin. Insts., What's a CDFI?, at http://
www.cdfi.org/whatcdfi.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) [hereinafter What's a
CDFI?].
83. See Faith, Hope and Capital (PBS Broadcast, Mar. 31, 2000), http://
www.pbs.org/capital/transcript-print.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) ("CDFIs
don't just sit back and watch .... [T]hey get out and try to teach people the
things they need to know .... ") [hereinafter Faith].
84. See 12 U.S.C. § 4701 (2001) (also known as the Riegle Community
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994). Congress appropriated $391 mil-
lion to the CDFI Fund over a four-year period. Several states, including New
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tions that meet the federal definition of CDFIs can receive fund-
ing through capital grants, loans, equity investments, deposits,
and acquisition of credit union shares.
To fall under the federal definition of a CDFI, a community
lending organization must be an institution that: (i) identifies its
primary mission as one of community development; (ii) serves
either an investment area or targeted population; (iii) provides
development services to support the borrowers and their loan
obligations; (iv) maintains community accountability either
through governing board representation or otherwise; and (v)
cannot have any government affiliation.8 5
Once the CDFI has met these criteria, the community lend-
ing organization must also submit a Comprehensive Strategic
Plan, a business plan-type application outlining its five-year strat-
egy, management, projections, and capital contributions from
non-federal sources.8 6 Upon designation as a CDFI, the federal
government releases the approved funds, limiting the total
amount to no more than $5 million for any three-year period.8 7
This financing scheme is one of the three main limitations
of the CDBFIA; the others are enforcement and lack of diversifi-
cation. First, although obtaining capital contributions from
other sources demonstrates marketplace approval, this federally
mandated fundraising diverts staff resources from community
development to grant solicitation.8 8 Also, even with increased
appropriations by Congress to the CDFI Fund, total funding is
still approximately $100 million below the initially agreed upon
amount in the CDBFIA.89 Second, the sole discretion and power
endowed to the Administrator of the CDFI Fund lacks accounta-
bility checks on the distribution of millions of scarce public dol-
lars.9" Similar to the economists' argument that the CRA
discourages diversification, which increases risk, the CDBFIA also
York, Pennsylvania, California, North Carolina, and New Jersey, have also fol-
lowed suit and provided funding to CDFIs through grants, tax credits, and
other support. See What's a CDFI?, supra note 82 (on file with the author and
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
85. See 12 U.S.C. § 4702(5) (a) (2001).
86. See Christopher Jordan Heisen, Community Development Lite: An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Community Development Financial Institutions Act, 39 How. L.J.
337, 345 (1995).
87. See 12 U.S.C. § 4707(d)(1) (2001).
88. See Cassandra Jones Havard, Synergy and Friction-The CRA, BHCs, the
SBA, and Community Development Lending, 86 Ky. LJ. 617, 648-50 (1997).
89. See Robert W. Shields, Community Development Financial Institutions and
the Community Development Financial Institutions Act of 1994: Good Ideas in Need of
Some Attention, 17 ANN. REv. BANKING L. 637, 671 (1998).
90. See Havard, supra note 88, at 666.
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concentrates loans to a specific locality. Thus, a local economic
event, such as the main town employer filing for bankruptcy or
moving overseas, would directly and substantially decrease the
profitability and even affect the viability of a CDFI.9'
However, the Act remains appealing as a private sector
incentives program, working with the market instead of against
it. Professionals trained to target the specific niche of consumers
in their neighborhoods organize CDFIs. They can fill the credit
gap and provide the social capital needed to redevelop aban-
doned communities.
There are a variety of forms under which CDFIs may oper-
ate. Each type has developed a range of strategies to reach the
central goals of community reinvestment and economic
revitalization.
C. Types of CDFIs
CDFIs can: (i) be urban or rural; (ii) serve single or multiple
communities; (iii) operate in one state or a number of states; (iv)
be free-standing entities or subsidiaries of other community
development corporations; (v) be a subsidiary of a large retail
commercial bank's holding company; (vi) serve a geographic
community or a particular population, like minorities or women;
(vii) be based in religious organizations; (viii) support specific
types of projects, such as micro-enterprises; (ix) be for-profit or
not-for-profit; and/or (x) be federally insured.
92
The financing for CDFIs can also come from a variety of
sources. As explored above, one major source of financing is the
federal government through distributions from the CDFI Fund.
But matching capital, depending on the CDFI's structure, can
also be raised from stock sales; equity capital investments; mem-
ber deposits; short and long term loans from commercial banks
at below-market rates for debt capital; secondary market loans;
revenue from financial services; and charitable grants from pri-
vate foundations, corporations, government programs, and
banks.93 With the above permutations available to community
organizations, they are able to find the business financing struc-
ture that best fits their community's needs. These are, however,
the five most popular organizational structures.
91. See id. at 649.
92. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 599-601 (citations omitted).
93. See id. at 601-02.
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1. Community Development Banks
CDBs are for-profit corporations, utilizing a stock form of
ownership, regulated by federal and state banking authorities,
and have their deposits insured by the FDIC.9 4 Investors need to
consider the large capital requirement and regulatory compli-
ance in deciding whether to choose this form of entity.95 CDBs
rely on grants from the CDFI Fund and deposits from individuals
and institutions, yielding below-market rates, as their primary
source of capital.96 Their purpose is to "provide capital to
rebuild economically distressed communities through targeted
lending and investment."97 Their typical borrowers are non-
profit community organizations, individual entrepreneurs, small
businesses, and housing developers.98
CDBs tend to be larger than the other forms of CDFIs and
can have subsidiaries providing other community development
services.99 Due to their size and corporate structure, CDBs are
probably the most flexible of the CDFI entities, offering a wide
range of financial services to their customers, including home
mortgage financing; home improvement; small business, non-
profit and student loans; and traditional consumer banking.
100
Large CDBs could also provide funding and technical assistance
in establishing and maintaining other CDFIs.
2. Community Development Credit Unions
Credit unions are financial cooperatives formed around a
group of people with a commonality. 0 1 CDCUs are basically
non-profit financial cooperatives owned and operated by their
members, generally lower-income persons, who adopt a commu-
nity charter that requires the CDCU only to serve members of
94. See Coalition of Community Dev. Fin. Insts., Comparison of Commu-
nity Development Financial Institution Types, at http://www.cdfi.org/cdfi-
type.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Coalition CDFI Types];
Nat. Community Cap. Ass'n, Community Development-Comparison of
CDFI Types, at http://www.communitycapital.org/community-development/
finance/cdfitypes.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Community
Capital CDFI Types].
95. See Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94.
96. See id.; Community Capital CDFI Types, supra note 94.
97. Community Capital CDFI Types, supra note 94.
98. See id.
99. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 603.
100. See Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94; Community Capital CDFI
Types, supra note 94; Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 603.
101. An example of a CDCU is the Vermont Development Credit Union,
at http://www.vdcu.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
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their particular community. 1°2 The "community" can be a geo-
graphic community, a religious or ethnic group, or an occupa-
tion. 103 The promotion of "community ownership of assets and
savings, [the provision of] affordable credit and retail financial
services to lower-income people with special outreach to minority
communities "104 serves as the CDCU's purpose.
The start-up considerations for a CDCU are the need to
organize the community it's attempting to serve and, similar to a
CDB, to comply with federal and state regulatory agencies and
the accompanying burdens.'0 5 Additionally, CDCUs are subject
to the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA") regula-
tions because the NCUA insures CDCUs.
10 6
Government grants, member deposits and limited non-
member deposits from social investors generally fund CDCUs.' °7
Like CDBs, CDCUs also offer a wide range of consumer banking
services, ranging from savings accounts, check cashing, personal
and home rehabilitation loans, and credit counseling, to business
planning support.10 8
3. Community Development Loan Funds
CDLFs are non-profit, democratic loan funds that pool capi-
tal from individual and institutional social investors, such as the
government, private corporations, banks, religious organizations,
insurance companies and foundations. CDLFs often receive this
capital at below-market rates and then re-lend this money to eco-
nomically distressed urban and rural lower-income communi-
ties."' The board and loan committees, consisting of
community investors, borrowers, and technical experts, generally
cater to non-profit community organizations, social service prov-
iders, and small businesses."1
0
Unlike CDBs and CDCUs, CDLFs cannot receive deposits
because they are not insured depository institutions.' There-
fore, CDLFs are limited in the services they can offer, basically
102. See Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94; Community Capital CDFI
Types, supra note 94; Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 604.
103. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 604.
104. Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94; Community Capital CDFI





109. See id.; Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 605.
110. See Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94; Community Capital CDFI
Types, supra note 94.
111. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 605-06.
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providing only housing construction, and business start-up and
expansion loans." 2 However, CDLFs are very involved in their
loans, extensively guiding borrowers before, during and after the
transaction.' 1 3 Additionally, CDLFs are largely self-regulated,
which results in more flexibility in start-up and lending
requirements.1 1 4
4. Community Development Venture Capital Funds
Being emerging sources of financing in the private sector, it
was only natural for venture capital funds to be adapted for com-
munity reinvestment. CDVCFs "specialize[ ] in providing finan-
cial equity investments in new and existing businesses which
need something more than additional debt through bank
loans."'1 5 Their efforts, funded by foundations, corporations,
individuals, and the government, are well suited for community
real estate and medium-sized business projects, especially for the
start-up of a new business.
5. Micro-Enterprise Loan Funds
Small businesses and self-employed entrepreneurs often
need loans for routine business purposes. These small-scale
loans tend to be smaller and less favorably viewed by traditional
lenders because they are not tied to an expansion or new idea
that would increase potential profitability. Thus, many commer-
cial banks do not want to approve or even go through the trouble
of paperwork for these loans. But often, these general operating
support loans are crucial in continuing community businesses.
With the purpose of fostering social and business development,
MELFs were created to meet this need, providing a few thousand
dollars or less (sometimes without collateral) with substantial
training and technical assistance in social and business develop-
ment." 6 Like CDLFs, MELFs can be funded and organized in a
variety of forms, "as long as the basic focus and activity is prima-
rily oriented at community economic development." ' 7
The variety of available CDFI entities provide communities
with distinct organizational structures created specifically to meet
the individualized needs of the surrounding neighborhood. Just
112. See Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94; Community Capital CDFI
Types, supra note 94.
113. See id.
114. See id.; Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 606.
115. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 607.
116. See Coalition CDFI Types, supra note 94; Community Capital CDFI
Types, supra note 94; Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 608.
117. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 609.
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as businesses have a number of entity structures to choose from,
the structure of a CDFI is only limited by one's creativity. New
secondary markets, like the securitization of CRA loans,' 18 and
new entities mirroring for-profit vehicles, such as the real estate
investment trust,"' have evolved as "innovative, market-driven
approach [es] that provide[ ] sustainable capital flows into under-
served communities."' 2 ° Community lending organizations can
form their CDFIs to fit the nuances of their communities. With
this flexibility, CDFIs are perfectly poised to not only fulfill the
credit void in low- and middle-income communities, but to fulfill
the CRA requirements for banks as well.
III. USING CDFIs TO SATISFY CRA REQUIREMENTS
Seeing the synergistic benefits, the federal regulators specifi-
cally recommended and encouraged the banking industry to
embrace the use of CDFIs in satisfying CRA requirements. CDFIs
can provide banks with the indispensable human resources of
local knowledge of surrounding businesses and residents,
whereas banks can commit the necessary capital. CDFIs welcome
the influx of capital from banks, and banks can receive CRA com-
pliance credit for their CDFI investments. This marriage of labor
resources from the CDFIs and capital resources from banks cre-
ate an effective partnership, which meets the original stated pur-
pose and goals of the CRA.
Community activists, who organize CDFIs, are truly passion-
ate about their neighborhoods, loans, and customers. Unlike
their retail bank counterparts who are only interested in the bot-
tom line, CDFI loan officers see their loans as three-dimensional:
people, families, and communities. They are willing to provide
the additional, necessary support, financially and psychologically,
to back up their borrowers. "Sometimes I find I'm just a cheer-
leader, back there trying to keep somebody going."'
21
Although all CDFIs are formed with the social goal of com-
munity reinvestment, CDFIs and their investors do expect a
return on their loans.'2 2 Loan applicants do have to go through
a thorough evaluation process and CDFIs do require certain cri-
118. See Joshua Brockman, CRA Loan Securitization Market Grows As Banks
Add to Their Savvy, Experts Say, AM. BANKER, Apr. 23, 1999, at 8.
119. See Kim Renay Anderson, Nation's First AH REIT Launched, NAT'L
MORTGAGE NEWS, June 14, 1999.
120. Access Capital Strategies, ACS, Announces Profitable Growth and Expansion
for Community Investment Fund, Bus. WiRE, Oct. 30, 2000.
121. Faith, supra note 83 (quoting Dave Kleiber of Cascadia Revolving
Fund in Seattle, Wash.).
122. See id.
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teria to be met. But CDFIs will forgo some of the more conven-
tional credit standards, attributable to retail banks, for loans that
promote community building and financial independence.
"[D]oes this person have the drive, do they have the experi-
ence? ... [T]hose are strengths. It's not collateral . . . but it's a
reason for us to believe that this person can pay this loan
back."12 CDFIs believe that some of the loan applications
turned away by banks are "good credit risks and if given the
chance to succeed, they can become anchors that strengthen
whole communities."
124
Being locally active, CDFIs have inside knowledge of the best
lending opportunities.' 2 5 They really get to know their borrow-
ers and the nuances of the community; thus, CDFIs can more
effectively evaluate loans with that in mind. Although only CDBs
and CDCUs are federally insured, the Federal Reserve Board
reported that default and delinquency rates were low.12 6 Addi-
tionally, the study confirmed that overall, CRA lending is profita-
ble. 127 Logically for CDFIs to remain viable, similar to banks,
they too must make safe and sound lending decisions.
Commercial banks used to be able to provide many of the
services that CDFIs now offer. Banks used to be much more local
and community-based, but with the need to create economies of
scale and their duty to maximize profits, banks could no longer
provide the personal service necessary to their communities.
However, now banks can return to their roots by supporting and
investing in CDFIs. Banks can open CDFIs as subsidiaries in their
holding company structures, have their officers sit on CDFI
boards to advise on lending or organizational matters, or simply
provide financial support. In addition to meeting their societal
responsibilities, banks would also receive CRA credit for these
activities. "Since 1995, banks have been one of the fastest grow-
ing sources of funds for [CDFI] lending and investing."1 2
CDFIs are one of the most effective and easiest ways to com-
ply with the CRA requirements. Rather than entering into unfa-
miliar community-based loan transactions, banks can have
CDFIs, the community experts, review the application, conduct
the transaction, and follow-up during the loan period. To
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 610-11.
126. Financial Reform Bill Inches Toward Implementation, CDFI NEWS, vol. 8,
no. 6, July 2000, at 3 (referring to the Profitability Survey, supra note 60).
127. Id.
128. Nat'l Community Cap. Ass'n, Bank-CDFI Partnerships, at 1 (citing a
subset of their membership (34 CDFIs) for which they have five years of data).
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receive CRA credit, all a bank needs to do is provide the financial
resources. The relationship between banks and CDFIs is mutu-
ally favorable and increases the overall community economic
health.
This beneficial relationship can easily be broadened to
include other financial services organizations as well. Nowadays,
banks are not the only entities that extend credit to consumers.
Financial holding companies offer a variety of financial services,
and with economies of scale, can sell loans at extremely competi-
tive rates. Rather than fighting for the market share in commu-
nity lending, these financial holding companies can also share
synergies with CDFIs, achieving profit and meeting their social
responsibility.
IV. THE FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION MOVEMENT
In the last few years, the banking and financial services
industry has experienced much deregulation. Mainly through
the repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act,129 the amendment of
the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act, 130 and the enactment of
the GLBA,13 1 Congress has allowed some consolidation of the
banking, insurance, and securities industries. However, these
updated changes were made without corresponding changes to
the CRA. Currently, CRA regulation only applies to the banking
industry. With further consolidation, it will be difficult to deline-
ate which companies are considered in the banking industry.
These new financial holding companies can avoid CRA require-
ments by shifting their banking activities and assets into their
holding company affiliates, which are not subject to CRA regula-
tion. 132 The CRA needs to be equally modernized to bring secur-
ities firms and insurance companies in line with banks to advance
community revitalization goals.
In this climate of high merger activity, creating larger finan-
cial conglomerates, the CRA and CDFIs have become more visi-
ble and important. For expansion-oriented banks, the CRA is an
essential component of business planning because the regulatory
agencies can reject bank merger applications solely based on
poor CRA compliance. As banks get larger and larger, they are
129. §§ 16, 20, 21, 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78 &
377-78 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (repealed 1999).
130. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (amended 1999).
131. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
132. Financial Services Act of 1999: Hearing on H.& 10 Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of
Deborah Goldberg), http://www.communitychange.org/hrl0tst.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 24, 2002).
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less adept at meeting local community needs. Thus, the need for
CDFIs and the benefits of investing in CDFIs to meet CRA
requirements becomes more apparent.
The economy and marketplace have changed dramatically
since the inception of the CRA. Although the original premise
of the act is still applicable, its application is outdated. Banks
were previously the only institutions capable of lending, but with
the deregulation of the financial services industry, other institu-
tions are entering the banking business. It would be illogical to
hold the banking industry accountable for community economic
development while ignoring insurance companies and securities
firms who have entered the practice of banking.
Another good example of the need to update the CRA is the
introduction of e-business. Would an Internet bank be subject to
CRA requirements? What would their defined "community" be?
Some creative Internet companies have found a market in pro-
viding payment services for Internet purchases. These accounts
can hold deposits for future purchases, are insured up to
$100,000, and can earn interest in a money market fund."'3
Though performing one of the main banking functions as a pay-
ment system, these Internet sites are not chartered as banks, nor
are they regulated as banks."' Another problem arises with
banks that have 24-hour Internet access as the boundary of their
"community" in this case is ill-defined. The federal legislature
needs to look at the CRA provisions and update its applicability
to meet today's changed financial services environment.
V. CONCLUSION
After several decades of abandonment, low- and middle-
income communities have discovered that economic revitaliza-
tion and restoration require their own efforts and innovation.
They can no longer wait for their knight in shining armor to
133. See PayPal, Account Types, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/
webscr?cmd=p/gen/accounts-outside (last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
134. One example is PayPal.com, an on-line payment system where
money can be sent directly to an email address. Although, PayPal vehemently
claims it is "not a bank and the Service is a payment processing service rather
than a banking service," four states are investigating to see if PayPal is engaged
in banking practices and thus, subject to a regulatory process. See PayPal, About
Us, at http://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/about-outside (last
visited Feb. 24, 2002); Paypal Warning, at http://www.paypalwarning.com (last
updated Feb. 22, 2002). Other examples are AnyPay.com, Billpoint.com started
by eBay.com and backed by Wells Fargo Bank, c2it.com started by Citibank, and
Western Union Bid Pay at bidpay.com, which pays with money orders. See Alter-
natives to Paypal, at http://www.paypalwarning.com/Alternatives/Default.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
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endow their communities with prosperity with the wave of a
wand. In these days of economic recession, this could not be
more relevant. In order to gain financial independence, low-
and middle-income communities must build and strengthen
their economic infrastructure from within. One necessary means
is the availability of credit tailored to lower income communities
and their needs.
The problems and discrimination that motivated Senator
Proxmire to sponsor the CRA still exist today. In order to retain
the effectiveness of the CRA and reflect the changing financial
industry, we need to update the CRA and keep pace with the
modern economy. Legislators need to review the impact of the
Internet, bank deregulation, and globalization of the credit
market.
With government support in the forms of an updated CRA,
the CDBFIA, increased appropriations to the CDFI Fund, and
community organizations continually developing innovative enti-
ties and programs, we, as a society, are hopefully making inroads
in eradicating such barriers. Using the CRA and CDFIs, commu-
nities can continue to hold their corporate neighbors accounta-
ble for community development.
"CDFIs represent one of the most progressive means for
community revitalization entrepreneurs to have a long-lasting
impact on their neighborhoods through their grass roots knowl-
edge of local lending and investing markets." '35 This local
expertise creates a unique opportunity for banks to receive CRA
credit without entering into unfamiliar transactions. The eco-
nomic goals of banks and the societal goals of community groups
do not need to be mutually exclusive of each other. Although
banks may not receive the highest interest rate through these
loans, they receive the greater social profit of fulfilling their
moral obligations as corporate citizens and promoting the suc-
cess of the surrounding community.
CDFIs can limit a bank's risk and cost in CRA compliance
while providing full-service lending support to its community.
The primary goal of community reinvestment is addressed as well
as continued community development. CDFIs are unique in
their role as a bridge between the social goals of community rein-
vestment and the profit-making goals of any business entity.
Community lending organizations take ownership of their com-
munities and have a vested interest in not just the one loan trans-
action, but also the continued success of the borrower.
135. Santiago et al., supra note 4, at 650-51.
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Exemplifying the adage, you can give a man fish, and it will feed
him for a day, but teach a man to fish and you will feed him for a
lifetime.
